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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Warren L. Swanson and Roger W. Eichmeier*

Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication and
Constitutional Rlights-In recent months several important and interesting decisions have
been rendered by appellate courts regarding the
taking, without consent, of specimens of blood,
urine, and breath from motorists suspected or
accused of driving while intoxicated. The appellate court opinions in these various cases are
presented here in abstract form.
A United States Supreme Court Decision:
Following an accident in which three persons
were killed and the defendant seriously injured,
an empty whiskey bottle was found in the defendant's car. He was then taken to a hospital
where a state police officer noted the smell of
alcohol on the unconscious defendant's breath.
An officer thereupon requested that a blood
sample be removed from the defendant. The
sample was taken by an attending physician
and, upon laboratory analysis, was found to
contain an intoxicating percentage of alcohol.
The defendant was thereafter indicted on a
charge of manslaughter. At the trial, testimony
regarding the blood sample was introduced
despite the defendant's objection. Following his
conviction, the defendant sought his release
from imprisonment through a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus directed to the Supreme
Court of New Mexico. Upon the denial of his
petition, he sought and was granted certiorari
by the United States Supreme Court. That
Court, with three members dissenting, affirmed
the defendant's conviction, holding that the
removal of a blood sample, from an unconscious
person, by a competent physician at the direction of police officers does not violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
On appeal, the Court easily rejected the de*Senior Law Students, Northwestern University
School of Law.

fendant's initial argument that use of the blood
sample violated the fourth and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. Prior
decisions of the Court, it was said, have established that those amendments are not included
within the restriction placed upon the states
by the fourteenth amendment. As his primary
argument, the defendant contended that the
conduct of the officers violated that standard of
due process of law which had been developed
by the Court in the case of Rockin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952). In that case, the Court
had held that, by illegally breaking into a defendant's home and forcibly pumping his
stomach in order to recover narcotics, the
police had denied the defendant his right to due
process under the fourteenth amendment. Such
conduct, the Court had said, "shocked the
conscience" and was so "brutal" and "offensive" as to violate traditional notions of decency
and fair play. The Court in the present case,
however, distinguished the Rockin decision.
"There is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive'," the
Court said, "in the taking of a sample of blood
when done, as in this case, under the protective
eye of a physician." The fact that the defendant
was unconscious when the test was conducted,
the Court indicated, did not in itself constitute
a constitutional violation. Due process, the
Court said, is measured by "that whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has
been woven by common experience into the
fabric of acceptable conduct." Since a blood
test, the Court continued, has become a routine
experience, its performance by a skilled technician is not "conduct that shocks the conscience." In addition, the Court said, "since
our criminal law is to no small extent justified
by the assumption of deterrence, the individual's right to immunity from such invasion of
the body as is involved in a properly safeguarded blood test is far outweighed by the
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value of its deterrent effect due to public realization that the issue of driving while under the
influence of alcohol can often by this method
be taken out of the confusion of conflicting
contention." Nevertheless, the Court continued,
compulsory blood removal under different conditions by incompetent persons may violate the
Rochin rule.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting, argued
that the majority had misconstrued the standard of due process developed in the Rochin
decision. Both the Rochin decision and the
present case, the dissent said, involved the
common elements of the invasion of a person's
body without his consent. The dissent considered immaterial the absence, in the present
case, of physical resistance by the defendant.
"Where there is no affirmative consent," the
dissent reasoned, "I cannot see that it should
make any difference whether one states unequivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such condition
that he is unable to protest." Since there was
no consent, the dissent contended, the invasion
of the body, rather than the element of physical
resistance should have been determinative of
the due process question. The dissent considered it irrelevant that blood tests are
frequently encountered in everyday life and
are a scientific method of crime detection. "We
should hold," the dissent said, "that due process
means at least that law-enforcement officers in
their efforts to obtain evidence from persons
suspected of crime must stop short of bruising
the body, breaking skin, puncturing tissue or
extracting body fluids, whether they contemplate doing it by force or by stealth."
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in a separate
opinion, argued that even though evidence is
obtained from a defendant through trickery
rather than force, it is nevertheless involuntarily obtained and its use should not be permitted. "It is repulsive to me for the police to
insert needles into an unconscious person," he
said, "in order to get the evidence necessary to
convict him, whether they find the person unconscious, give him a pill which puts him to
sleep, or use force to subdue him."

A Wisconsin Supreme Court Decision:
Following an automobile accident which resulted in several deaths, the defendant, the
driver of a vehicle involved, was taken by
police to a hospital. At the hospital the smell
of liqu6r was noted on the defendant's breath.
As a result, the prosecutor directed that a
blood test be taken. While the defendant was
in a semi-conscious state, the blood sample was
removed without requesting or obtaining his
consent. Nine days later, a warrant was issued
for the defendant's arrest on a charge of negligent homicide. Prior to the trial the defendant
made a motion to suppress evidence of the
blood sample on the grounds that the receipt
into evidence of the results of the blood test
would: a) violate the privilege against selfincrimination provided by the state constitution; b) violate the prohibition- against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the
state constitution; and c) deprive the defendant
of due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In answer to questions of law propounded by the trial court, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin held that although the use of the
blood sample would not violate the state
privilege against self-incrimination, the taking
of the specimen from a semi-conscious person
without his consent and prior to his arrest
violates the state constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure. In
addition, the court held, use of such evidence
in violation of the state constitution constitutes
a denial of due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. State v. Kroening, 79
N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 1956).
In regard to the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the court conceded that
"the prohibition against one's being compelled
to be a witness against himself should not be
limited to exclusion of merely oral statements
against himself." However, the court said, once
the privilege is extended beyond oral statements, the limitations on its application are not
clear. The court based its present limitation of
the privilege upon the reasoning, not set forth
in the opinion, of analogous precedents.
Concerning the application of the state con-
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stitutional prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure, the court noted that it had
adopted the federal rule that evidence secured
through an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible at the trial. The court rejected the
prosecution's argument that the right to security of the person does not extend to portions of
the body. "Surely the security is, impaired,"
the court said, "if public officials may without
consent and without arrest, stick needles into
human bodies and draw off and carry away
such of the body's contents as the officials deem
expedient." The court also rejected the prosecution's notion that the taking of blood is
merely a physical examination rather than a
search and seizure. "We do not understand,"
the court said, "that the constitutional provision in question forbids officers to go through
one's pockets but permits them to go through
his veins." In addition, the court refused to
accept the prosecution's contention that the
blood test was incident to a lawful arrest and
was therefore not an illegal search. While a
search without a warrant incident to an arrest
is lawful, the court said, the arrest of the defendant in the present case took place nine days
following the blood test. The test, the court
held, was thus used to secure evidence upon
which to base the arrest and was therefore not
incident to a lawful arrest. Pointing out that
the alcoholic content of blood diminishes with
time, the prosecution urged the court to relax
its rules relating to search and seizure. The
court decided, however, that such action should
be taken through constitutional amendment
rather than through judicial interpretation. In
regard to the alleged violation of due process,
the court concluded that evidence obtained in
violation of a state constitutional provision
constitutes a denial of the defendant's right to
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
A California Appellate Court Decision:
In another recent case, it was held that the
forcible removal of a blood sample from a conscious person prior to his arrest neither constitutes an illegal search and seizure nor
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
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amendment. People v. Duroncelay,303 P.2d 617
(Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1956). In that case,
following an accident, officers noted beer cans
in the injured defendant's car and the smell of
liquor on his breath. A nurse, at the direction
of police, undertook to administer the test. The
defendant was conscious at the time and, while
he did not verbally protest, attempted to withdraw his arm which was then secured by an
attendant. The court held that the test was
incident to a lawful arrest and, in addition,
that the degree of force used to obtain the
sample was not sufficient to violate due process
of law.
An Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals Decision:
Following her arrest for a traffic violation,
officers noted the smell of alcohol on the defendant's breath. Upon arriving at the police
station, the defendant was directed by officers
to walk a white line painted on the floor, to
pick up some coins, and perform other manual
tests to determine her physical condition. In
connection with a Harger drunkometer breath
test, the defendant was then told to blow up a
balloon. At the trial, the defendant objected
to the receipt in evidence of the results of the
manual tests and of the drunkometer test on
the ground that they were not voluntarily submitted to and were therefore obtained in
violation of her privilege against self-incrimination. While neither threats nor physical
coercion were employed by the police, the defendant argued that she complied with the
officers' directions because she thought she was
required to. Following the rejection of her
arguments by the trial court, the defendant
then objected to the testimony of the police
officer who administered the breath test, on the
grounds that he was not qualified. The officer
testified as to the reading produced by the
drunkometer device and its significance as
shown by a chart used to interpret the test
results. The officer was not a qualified chemist
and could neither explain the relationship between the alcohol in the breath and in the blood
nor calculate the formulas involved. In the
absence of such ability, the defendant argued,
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the officer's testimony was hearsay. The prosecutor then offered the testimony of an expert
chemist who interpreted the test results for the
jury. On appeal from her conviction, the court
affirmed the admission of the evidence, holding
that compulsory tests for intoxication do not
violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
Alexander v. State, 305 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim.
1956).
The court conceded that the defendant had
performed the tests involuntarily because of
her fear of the police officers. However, the
court held that the results of the tests were
nevertheless admissible. Upon examination of
decisions from other jurisdiction, the court
adopted the view that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination applies only to
oral or written evidence and not to physical
evidence. The reason for this distinction, the
court said, is that oral or written words obtained
through fear of duress or hope of reward, are
likely to be influenced by such motives and are
thus untrustworthy. This objection, it was said,
does not apply to physical facts which the
defendant cannot alter. "It is not the purpose
of the amendment against self-incrimination,"
the court concluded, "to allow the destruction
or passing over of all evidence of physical facts
showing who and in what condition the defendant was following a lawful arrest." In regard
to the alleged incompetency of the officer who
administered the drunkometer test, the court
noted that the device used by the officer was a
color-change test. For the results of such a test
to be admissible, the court said, the evidence
must contain: a) proof that the proper amounts
of chemicals were used; b) proof that the machine and operator were under the periodic
supervision of one who understands the scientific theory of the device; and c) testimony of
a witness qualified to calculate and translate
the reading of the drunkometer into the percentage of alcohol in the blood. In the present
case, it was said, the officer who administered
the test was not qualified to meet the third
requirement. However, the court said, operation
of the color-change test to obtain the percentage
blood alcohol readings requires neither knowledge of chemistry, nor an understanding of

the rtieaning of the operation. Such operation
only requires the ability to follow the procedures
involved. The required testimony as to the
meaning of the readings, the court said, may be
furnished k" an expert witness other than the
operator of the machine. Such an expert, the
court said, interpreted the test results in the
present case.
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Execution of
Search Warrant Held Inadmissible in Federal
Court-Armed with a search warrant, police
officers arrived at the entry of the defendant's
home. An officer knocked twice on the door,
and upon receiving no response from within,
was instructed by his superior to "break the
door open." The officer then pushed the door
"and the door flew open." As a result of evidence obtained through a search of the premises,
the defendant was indicted on a charge of
operating a lottery. At the trial in a federal
district court the defendant made a motion to
exclude the evidence obtained in the search on
the grounds that the warrant was illegally executed in violation of 18 U.S.C. §3109 (1953),
which provides than a officer may break open
a door "if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance." The trial
court denied the motion. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circut reversed, holding that evidence obtained through the illegal execution of
a search warrant must be suppressed. Woods v.
United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
The statute, the court said, is a restatement
of the common law which required, prior to a
forcible entry, that officers request and be refused admittance. In the present case, it was
said, by failing to announce that they were
police or that they were authorized to enter
under a warrant, the forcible entry was unlawful. Evidence thus obtained through an illegal
execution of a search warrant, the court concluded, is inadmissible.
An opposite conclusion, based upon facts
similar to those of the Woods case, was arrived
at in the recent case of United States v. Freeman,
144 F.Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1956). That case indicated that an illegal execution of a search
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warrant would not render evidence thereby
seized inadmissible.
Statute Authorizing Fire Marshal to Deny
Witness Counsel at Arson Hearing Does Not
Violate Fourteenth Amendment-Following the
destruction by fire of the defendants' factory,
the Ohio State Fire Marshal instigated an
investigation into the causes of the fire and
subpoenaed the defendants to appear as witnesses at an investigatory hearing. At the hearing, the Fire Marshal refused to permit the
defendants' counsel to be present during their
testimony. As the basis of his action, the Marshal relied on Ohio Rev. Code §3737.13 (1953),
which provides tlat the "investigation.. . may
be private" and that the Marshal may "exdude from the place where the investigation
is held all persons other than those required to
be present." The defendants refused to be
sworn and testify without the presence of their
counsel. As a result, the Marshal committed
the defendants for contempt in accordance with
§3737.12, which provides that "no witness
shall refuse to be sworn or refuse to testify,"
and §3737.99(a), which provides that "whoever
violates §3737.12 may be summarily punished,
by the officer concerned, by commitment to
the county jail until such person is willing to
comply with the order of such officer." The
defendants' petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court. That
court construed §3737.13 as authorizing the
Fire Marshal to exclude witnesses' counsel
from the hearing. Alleging the unconstitutionality of the statute, the defendants then petitioned for and were granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. That Court,
with four members dissenting, affirmed, holding that a statute authorizing a state fire
marshal to exclude a witness' counsel during
the witness' testimony does not violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In re Groban, 77 Sup. Ct. 510 (1957).
A defendant in a state criminal trial, the
Court noted, has an unqualified right under the
fourteenth amendment to have counsel present
during the proceedings. However, the Court
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said, such a prosecution differs from an administrative investigation of "incidents damaging
to the economy or dangerous to the public."
The hearing before the Fire Marshal, it was
said, was neither a criminal trial nor an adjudication of the defendants' responsibilities
for the fire. It was, the Court said, solely a
proceeding to elicit facts "to determine whether
the fire was the result of carelessness or design."
The Court considered immaterial the fact that
the defendants were under a legal duty to
speak and that their testimony might furnish
the basis for a criminal prosecution. A witness
before a grand jury, the Court pointed out, has
no right to be represented by counsel. The
defendants' protection, the Court said, lies in
his privilege against self-incrimination. In ad
dition, it was said, the possibility of improper
action by a state during a dosed hearing, does
not require that a state fire prevention procedure be altered. The presence of advisors to
witnesses, the majority concluded, might easily
make the hearing unwieldy and unworkable.
However, the Court indicated that a witness
charged .with unlawfully refusing to testify at
the hearing may have a right to counsel at the
proceeding during which the Fire Marshal
ascertains the witness' guilt and punishment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring
opinion, emphasized that a hearing before the
Fire Marshal is not an inquisition of suspects
but rather an inquiry by the state into the
causes of fires. The Fire Marshal, it was said,
is not a prosecutor. In addition, Justice Frankfurter rejected the notion that a witness would
be unaware of his privilege against self-incrimination if not advised by counsel.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that
the Fire Marshal is a law enforcement officer
charged with the ordinary duties of a policeman
rather than an impartial administrative investigator. The Fire Marshal, the dissent said,
is expressly made "responsible for the prosecution of persons believed to be guilty of arson or
similar crime." Compelling a person to appear
without counsel before a law enforcement officer
and testify in secret, the dissent said, "would
be a complete departure from our traditional
methods of law enforcement and would go a
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long way toward placing 'the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer.' "
There is no evidence, the dissent maintained,
that the enforcement of state fire laws requires
the vesting of such extreme powers of interrogation in the Fire Marshal.
(For a discussion of the general problems of
arson investigation which may arise under state
fire marshal -acts, see volume 47 of this Journal
at pages 457-465.)
Proof of Accuracy Not Required For Admission of Speedometer Reading-The defendant
was arrested for speeding on the basis of evidence obtained through the use of a radar
device. At the trial, the defendant objected to
the admission into evidence of the reading of
the radar device on the grounds that the accuracy of the equipment had not been established. In regard to the accuracy of the radar
device, the arresting officers testified that they
had driven a squad car through the radar beam
before and after the defendant was arrested
and that the radar reading had corresponded
with the reading of the squad car's speedometer.
The officers further testified that the squad
car's speedometer had been tested and found
to be accurate by another officer who was not
called as a witness. The defendant objected to
this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay and, in addition, objected to the admission
of the speedometer reading of the squad car
which had been used to test the radar device
on the ground that the accuracy of the speedometer had not been established by competent
evidence. The trial court, overruling the defendant's objection, admitted the evidence. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed, holding that evidence of the reading of
a squad car's speedometer at a particular time
is admissible to establish the accuracy of a
radar device despite the absence of evidence
as to the speedometer's accuracy. Petersow v.
State, 80 N.W.2d 688 (Neb. 1957).
The court indicated that the prosecution's
failure to call as a witness the officer who had
tested the accuracy of the squad car's speedometer was immaterial. The testimony of an
officer as to the reading at a particular time of

the vehicle's speedometer, the court held, is
prima facie evidence of the speed of the car at
that particular time. "The accuracy of speedometers," the court said, "is a matter of general
knowledge. Proof of accuracy carried back to
proof of accuracy of the master speedometer
and all of its parts is not necessary in speed
prosecutions."
Psychiatric Opinion and "Truth Serum"
Test Results Inadmissible as Regards the
Probability of Defendant's Guilt-Following his
arrest on a charge of sodomy, the defendant
was examined on two occasions by a qualified
psychiatrist. The first examination was neuropsychiatric in character and the second examination involved the use of an intravenous
injection of a "truth serum" known as sodium
pentathol. At the trial, the defendant sought
to introduce into evidence the psychiatrist's
testimony as to the results of his examination
for the purpose of establishing that the defendant was not a sexual deviate. The trial judge
denied admission of the testimony, ruling that
"it is not competent in a criminal trial for a
psychiatrist to tell the jury whether the defendant is a sexual pervert or whether he committed the crime or is capable of committing
it." On appeal, the exclusion of the psychiatric
testimony was affirmed. State v. Sinnott, 127
A.2d 424 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1956).
There was no indication, the court said, that
the psychiatrist would have revealed that the
defendant was organically incapable of the
crime. At most, the court said, the expert would
have exposed the improbability of the defendant's guilt because at the two examinations
he failed to manifest the characteristics of a
sexual deviate. The court expressed disapproval
of the use of expert testimony, based upon
psychiatric examinations, to thus establish
the defendant's character. Theoretically, the
court said, if such evidence were approved, it
might be used to show the improbability that
a defendant committed burglary or robbery.
In addition, the court said, since the expert
must generally state the basis of this opinion
such testimony might enable a defendant "'to
abstain from testifying and nevertheless have
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his defensive explanation revealed as a symptomatic psychological consideration upon which,
inter alia, the expert constructed his opinion."
In regard to testimony as to the results of
sodium pentathol examination, the court noted
that "the efficiency of the drug objectively in
the accomplishment of its intended purpose in
other than inquiries of sanity is as yet measurably experimental." However, the court refused
to announce a general rule concerning the use
of psychiatric testimony. Since appropriate
cases may arise in which such evidence would
not be objectionable the court advocated that
the problem be considered in the light of the
circumstances of the individual case.
In another recent case, it was held that
psychiatric testimony, based partly upon a
sodium pentathol examination, was admissible
in regard to the defendant's sanity. The court
emphasized that the truth serum examination
had constituted only a small part of the sanity
inquiry. Brown v. State, 304 P.2d 361 (Okla.
Crim. 1956).
Physical Evidence Obtained During Illegal
Delay in Arraignment Held Admissible in
Federal Court-At 6:40 P.M. the defendant was
arrested by federal officers on a charge of first
degree murder and taken to police headquarters. He was questioned intermittently during
the night and between 3:00 and 4:00 A.M.
that morning he made an oral confession, which
he repeated shortly after 8:00 A.M. Later in
the morning, he was taken by police to the
scene of the crime for the purpose of re-enacting
the occurrence. In his confession, the defendant
stated that he tore his trousers when he fled
following the murder. When asked where the
pants were, he told police that they were in this
room, and at 10:00 A.M., voluntarily conducted
officers there to retrieve the clothing. After the
police officers obtained the clothing, the defendant was returned to police headquarters where
he signed a written confession. The defendant
was then taken before a magistrate for arraignment. At the arraignment the defendant moved
to suppress evidence of the clothing on the
grounds that it was obtained during an illegal
delay in arraignment in violation of rule 5 (a)
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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion to suppress,
holding that an illegal delay in arraignment
does not render inadmissible physical evidence
obtained during such delay. United States v.
TVatsan, 146 F. Supp. 258 (D.D.C. 1956).
In enunciating its holding, the court said that
the McNabb rule, governing the admission in
evidence of a confession obtained during a delay
in arraignment, should not be extended so as
to exclude other evidence obtained under these
circumstances. The Court pointed out that
rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that an arrested
person must be arraigned "without unnecessary
delay" imposes no penalty upon its violation.
In addition the court said, the legislative history of rule 5 (a) indicates that, at the time the
federal rules were formulated, a proposal was
rejected which would have excluded a confession
obtained during a period of illegal delay. This
proposal was rejected, the court said, because
it would have penalized the public for police
officers' mistakes. The court concluded that
articles obtained during an unnecessary delay
in arraignment should be treated in the same
mamer as a confession so obtained and held
that such articles, if otherwise legally obtained,
are admissible in evidence.
Compelling Production of Urine Sample
Violates Military Code-Suspected of using
narcotics, the defendant, an Air Force enlisted
man, was ordered by his commanding officer
to furnish investigators with a specimen of his
urine for chemical analysis. Upon his refusal to
comply, the defendant was court-martialed
and convicted of refusing to obey a lawful order.
On appeal the defendant contended that the
order was unlawful on the grounds that it
violated article 31 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. That article provides that no
person subject to the Code "may compel any
person to incriminate himself or to answer any
question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him." The United States Court of
Military Appeals, with one member dissenting,
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
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that to compel a person against his will, to
produce a urine sample for use as evidence in a
courtmartial proceeding violates the Uniform
Code. United States ,. Jordan, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957).
The majority based its decision upon an
analysis of civilian precedents which have dealt
with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Federal courts, it was said, have in several instances held admissible in evidence urine
specimens obtained without a defendant's
consent. However, the court reasoned, these
cases emphasized that the specimens at the
time they were obtained were not secured for
the purpose of obtaining evidence of a law
violation. In addition, the court said, the cases
did not involve the use of compulsion. A military order, the court pointed out, constitutes
strong compulsion. Therefore, the majority
concluded, ordering a person to furnish a urine
sample for use as evidence violates the Uniform
Code's prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination.
A concurring opinion, while agreeing with
the court's decision, disagreed with the reliance

placed by the majority upon civilian precedent.
The provision of the Uniform Code, it was
said, prohibiting anyone from compelling
another to incriminate himself has no civilian
counterpart. The Code's provision, the concurring judge maintained, contains no implied
limitation to testimonial utterances; it expressly
prohibits an order such as that involved in this
case.
The dissent criticized the majority for departing from the rule followed by the court
prior to this decision that an accused could be
lawfully required to perform an act which did
not require active participation or affirmative
conduct on his part. Under that rule, the dissent
said, compelling a person to undergo a physical
examination or furnish a blood sample had
been held lawful. This limitation on the privilege against self-incrimination, the dissent said,
has been approved by civilian authorities.
"While Congress and most forward-thinking
persons," the dissent concluded, "are striving
valiantly to control the traffic in habit-forming
drugs, we appear to be taking a step backward
in denying the Services a valuable and legal
means of controlling a most despicable offense".

(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 65-70, supra.)

